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This article uses the representation of vegetarianism in Richard Powers’ The Echo Maker 
(2006) and Jonathan Franzen’s Purity (2015) as a way to think about broader issues of 
ecological engagement. It argues that these issues are related to the ways in which each writer 
approaches questions of subjectivity and form after postmodernism. It concludes that the 
posthumanist dimension of Powers’ novel, achieved through formal experimentation, is a 
more successful engagement with the questions posed by the age of the Anthropocene than 
Franzen’s continued realism. 
 
 










A recent issue of the Times Literary Supplement features a review of two books which are 
concerned with cultural representations of meat, and another which considers four books 
focused on the ethics of eating meat.1 This suggests that the prominent trend in debating the 
ethics of eating, highlighted in the wide-readership of books such as Eric Schlosser’s Fast 
Food Nation (2001) and Michael Pollan’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma (2007), has taken a 
specific, and not unexpected, turn. In recent years, the ethics of eating meat has become 
framed as part of a wider debate on global sustainability and climate change with significant 
evidence now suggesting that reduction in or elimination of foods derived from animals 
would provide global economic and health benefits.2 As such it is hardly surprising that two 
writers frequently described as ‘econovelists’ – Richard Powers and Jonathan Franzen – have 
included the topic in recent novels.3 Both these writers also feature prominently in the 
conversation about postpostmodernism, and in this piece I use those ethical debates as a way 
to focus on matters of subjectivity and form after postmodernism.4 In the conclusion I frame 
these matters within the context of New Sincerity and the emergent concept of the 
Anthropocene to suggest that it is Powers’ The Echo Maker (2006), rather than Franzen’s 
Purity (2015), that most successfully addresses the cultural exigencies of the present. 
 
I. Purity and Human Failure 
There is a long history of association of female bodies with meat. It is long enough 
and important enough that one scholar – Carol J. Adams –  has written of the need for a 
‘feminist-vegetarian critical theory’ to address the matter of ‘the sexual politics of meat’.5 
Adams provides myriad examples of the association, as well as a framework for 
understanding the metaphor, ‘woman-as-meat’, which allows her to make a convincing case 




thus demonstrates a ‘sign of dis-ease with patriarchal culture’, and ought always be ‘part of 
the practice of feminism.’6 Anabel Tyler in Jonathan Franzen’s fifth novel, Purity, would 
certainly agree with Adams. When she is introduced to the reader she is wrapped in butcher 
paper with ‘YOUR MEAT’ scrawled across it as a protest against the underrepresentation of 
females on the Faculty of Tyler Art College.7 She continues her protestation of the linked 
exploitation of females and animals throughout her time at the college, and, for her final 
project at Tyler – a film titled ‘A River of Meat’ – splices together footage of a cow being 
bolt-gunned in a slaughterhouse with images of the coronation of Miss America in 1966. 
These are preparatory pieces for the major work of her life: the painstaking construction of a 
film detailing the inscription of a grid of 232-square-centimeter ‘cuts’ on her body, each of 
which she will spend a week acquainting herself with, in a bid to ‘reclaim possession of her 
body, cut by cut, from the world of men and meat.’ ‘After ten years,’ we are told, ‘she’d own 
herself entirely’ (402). Anabel’s rejection of the patriarchy is reflected in her rejection of her 
father’s fortune, the source of which is his work with McCaskil, one of the biggest corporate 
meat producers in the country. Literalising the metaphor that Adams highlights becomes both 
Anabel’s life’s work, and a way of reworking the conditions of that life.  
The presentation of this radical vegetarian-feminist warrants further attention because 
the way in which Anabel and her beliefs are framed in the novel suggests some of the reasons 
why she might feel the need to ‘reclaim’ herself from the world of men in the first place. That 
emphatic act of rebellion through which the reader is first acquainted with Anabel is undercut 
by the fact that the narrative trigger for it is the presentation, via a tip-off – and as if on a 
plate – of Anabel to Tom Aberrant, editor of the school magazine, as a possible subject for a 
juicy report. Anabel’s story, then, is in the hands of a controlling male editor, even before we 
meet the woman herself. Anabel and Tom begin a relationship that will eventually see them 




so seen through the male prism. This perspective undercuts and trivialises Anabel’s reasons 
for her vegetarianism; in so doing it also necessarily undercuts and trivialises her feminist 
ideals. The abstinence from flesh that Anabel has imposed upon Tom as a precondition of 
their relationship leaves him ‘constantly half nauseated’, and the description of Anabel as 
‘full-chestedly anorexic’ conflates the ‘symptoms’ of her dietary choice with those of an 
illness usually considered in terms of body-image issues; it also connotes that there is 
something unnatural about her retention of female attributes (195).8 Tom, we have been told, 
is ‘not afraid of anyone’s opinion of how he looked’, suggestively furthering the notion that 
Anabel’s malady is female and vain (177). Vegetarianism, then, is figured as unnatural and 
unhealthy; it is constructed as a disorder of the female mind, like hysteria, which, as with all 
mental illnesses has a concomitant effect on the body. When, after a few years, both the 
marriage and Anabel’s mental health start to fail, Tom feels guilty, commenting, ‘I couldn’t 
leave until I’d helped her out of the stuck place I’d allowed her to fall into’ (408). Both 
Anabel’s moral position and her agency are undermined by the characters’ pronouncement on 
her, and any attempt by Anabel to work her way out of that perspective – to ‘own herself 
entirely’ – seems doomed. 
One might be tempted to put this down to characterisation, with Tom’s comments 
constituting the expression of the inevitable frustrations of a relationship. However, the non-
chronological structuring of the novel frames how we view the dietary proclivities of Anabel, 
and seems to work to confirm this perspective on her. The novel opens with a mother 
lamenting the state of her body – and life – in a telephone conversation with her daughter: 
‘My body is betraying me again. Sometimes I think my life is nothing but one long process of 
bodily betrayal’ (3). The daughter – Purity ‘Pip’ Tyler – points out the universal nature of 
these concerns, but her mother is not pacified: ‘This is the terrible thing about bodies. 




subsequent rejection of Pip’s offer to bring her a cake with stevia in it because the sugar 
substitute has a deleterious effect on her ‘mouth chemistry,’ means that we are likely to agree 
with Pip’s assessment of her mother: ‘problematic,’ if not quite ‘crazy’ (3-4). Reviewers of 
Purity have certainly concurred with this view of the mother: ‘not-quite-sane’ was the verdict 
of Colm Toibin in The New York Times, an ‘oppressively needy hypochondriac’, suggested 
Duncan White in The Daily Telegraph, ‘a fully-fledged Miss Havisham’, wrote Tim Adams 
in the Guardian.9 Within these first few pages we also learn, but only indirectly, of the 
unsurprising dietary choice of this ‘Hippie single mom’: one of those on Pip’s shortlist of 
possible partners for her mother is deemed more suitable than the others because he is 
‘likewise a vegan’ (6).10 That veganism is coded, then, as an attempt on behalf of a 
‘problematic’ woman to establish control over the only part of her life amenable to it: her 
body. Corporeal in the original sense of ‘to do with the body’ rather than the spiritual, the 
concerns of Pip’s mother seem self-absorbed in the extreme. The mother here – ‘Penelope 
Tyler’ – is Anabel, who, in her struggle to reclaim her life from patriarchy has disavowed 
completely her former identity – though the intricate nature of the plotting means that the 
reader does not find this out until much later in the novel. The effect of this is that when 
Anabel is introduced in a following section set in the narrative past, the reader has already 
been primed to read female abstinence as the site where physical and moral vanity coincide; 
it encourages us to read her feminist-vegetarian ethic as the result of and perhaps a mask for 
these concerns.11  
The opening also, of course, proleptically confirms the view that without a controlling 
male – her father or Tom – Anabel cannot survive. The narrative seems to endorse the view 
of male predation and hopeless female victimhood set out by its nastiest of characters, the 
appropriately named Andreas Wolf, ‘internet outlaw’ (10). In an email to Pip, Wolf writes: 




predator to do, if it sympathises with smaller animals and won't accept that it was born to kill 
them, is to betray its nature and starve to death. But maybe it’s like something else – like 
being born with more money than others. Then the right thing to do becomes a more 
interesting social question’ (66). After the revelation of Wolf’s secret abuse of young, 
vulnerable women when acting as a church counselor, his thoughts here can only be 
interpreted as (hardly coherent) amoralistic solipsism designed to rationalise his own 
behaviour; it certainly does not help that the narrative itself (rather than simply Wolf) seems 
to offer up the rather tired trope of dysfunctional childhood and oedipal desires as the cause 
of (if not necessarily an excuse for) his abusive tendencies. That the much older Wolf 
successfully seduces Pip – into working for him, into a relationship with him – as part of 
what emerges as a complicated plot to get revenge on her father, only confirms the novel’s 
message of the vulnerability of women. 
It is surely one of the functions, and perhaps the main function – apart from to 
provoke cynical laughter – of Anabel as a flat character to demonstrate the more rounded, if 
still vulnerable, character of Pip. Pip, we are told, has learned from her mother ‘the 
importance of leading a morally purposeful life’, but she ‘shudders’ at the word ‘purity’ (29, 
47). In this way, her desire ‘to do good [deeds]’ ought to be contrasted against the rather 
different (and impossible aim) of being good, which, Franzen seems to intimate marks 
Anabel. Pip is marked as one who will shun the idealism of the most ardent character in the 
novel – her mother – in favour of doing what she can. Purity emerges, then, as a paean to the 
importance of being realistic, which Anabel is not. Early in the novel, Pip notes her mother's 
‘unworldliness’, and Tom’s mother, horrified at his choice of girlfriend, implores him to find 
a more ‘REALISTIC person to make a happy life with’ (7, 397; capitals in original); his 
experience with Anabel, indeed, leaves him with ‘a lifelong allergy to unrealistic women’ 




father, marks his return to ‘reality’ in the novel, as he uses the funds to establish his 
investigative newsmagazine and thus ‘do good’ with the impure money. Tom’s compromise 
is one that Anabel – who has run off, pregnant with Pip – would not accept. But, near the end 
of the novel, and in the narrative present, Anabel (now Penelope) is persuaded by Pip to 
finally take some of her father’s fortune because, in Pip’s words, ‘it’s real’ (554). Whether 
this is intended as a source of hope – the acceptance of an inheritance that will allow for a 
happier future (for Pip, at least) – or as a more cynical suggestion that, in the end, ideals 
mean nothing is an open question. But it certainly suggests that Franzen is continuing the 
trend of Freedom, in which he elaborates ‘how bogus is the very notion of sustaining a 
uniform world of coherent values – an ideological stance capable of withstanding all 
challenges to it,’ as Philip Weinstein puts it.12 Anabel’s worldview is characterised, 
caricatured, perhaps, as just such a bogus view – a struggle for an impossible, and, in the end, 
destructive ‘purity’ of body, mind and soul. Given that Tom’s acceptance of the money 
brought with it a renunciation of vegetarianism, one might wonder what will become of 
Anabel’s final acceptance of a reality premised upon money rather than ideals: the 
implication seems to be that it must also entail a repudiation of her vegetarian-feminist ethic. 
If the radical idealism of Anabel is stymied by the urge towards accepting ‘reality’ 
within the novel, it is also, I would suggest, constrained by the form of the novel. Some of the 
consequences of Franzen’s devotion to realism have been discussed by Margaret Hunt Gram 
in her reading of Freedom (2010). Hunt notes that the novel cleaves to a belief in the liberal 
individual subject (partly because of Franzen’s Lukácsian conception of realism), and 
suggests that this prevents it from successfully incorporating within its discourse one of the 
main themes: overpopulation. Unplottable at the level of the individual, Franzen can only 
represent this element by having Walter Berglund speechify, producing what Gram labels 




would suggest, is that Anabel’s vegetarianism can only be conceived as ‘an individual moral 
adventure’; as a result, it becomes little more than a mask for problems of the self, as we have 
seen.14 The novel does at one point gesture towards the broader context in which the ethics of 
eating needs to be placed: 
[…] to drive east on Amarillo Boulevard was to pass, in quick succession, the high-security Clements 
Unit prison complex, the McCaskill meat-processing facility, and the Pantex nuclear-weapons plant, three 
massive installations more alike than different in their brute utility and sodium-vapor lighting. In the rearview 
mirror were the evangelical churches, the Tea Party precinct, the Whataburgers. Ahead, the gas and oil wells, 
the fracking rigs, the overgrazed ranges, the feedlots, the depleted aquifer (173) 
But this only makes the dismissal of the vegetarianism (and by proxy the feminism) of 
Anabel even more problematic. Since the logic of the novel – in the sense not only of how 
other characters respond to Anabel, but how the structure frames the reader’s response to her 
– suggests Anabel’s disconnection from reality, with the corollary implication being that she 
ought to accept the world of her father and McCaskill, it is difficult to see how there can be 
any resistance to the rest of this clearly pejorative image of the States. The novel, in other 
words, accepts this world – as Anabel is persuaded to – and in so doing becomes complicit in 
it.  
II. The Echo Maker and Non-Human Possibility 
In ‘Making the Rounds’, Richard Powers writes that, ‘physics has increasingly moved away 
from reducing systems to individual, controlled variables and towards representing by means 
of massive simulation. To understand rich phenomena in the real world, new sciences 
build analogous rich evocative models and then explore the systemic effects of small 
changes within the simulation’.15 Powers’ description of the new physics might also serve as 
a description of the way in which the novel has traditionally functioned. Certainly in Powers’ 




for Mark Schluter, the character around which the novel rotates. The Echo Maker opens with 
the aftermath of a car crash in which Mark has suffered a severe brain trauma, leaving him 
with Capgras Syndrome, a condition which severs the connection between external reality 
and emotion. Although Mark sees the world around him accurately, his brain no longer 
produces the affective response that gives that world meaning. He can recognize Karin, his 
sister, for instance, but he cannot recognize her as his sister; for Mark, this Karin is an 
imposter, a nearly perfect replica of the real Karin. As the novel proceeds this failure of 
affective association extends first to Mark’s dog, then his home, and eventually the whole 
town. The tightly controlled plot of the novel – a hallmark of Powers, whose fiction manages 
to dovetail (not always successfully) the highly cerebral and the narrative drive of a bestseller 
– hinges upon two questions: what happened to Mark on the night of his accident? and will 
he ever recover his true self and see the world around him for the reality that it is? While 
Powers dutifully answers the former of these, the latter is held in abeyance, for it is represents 
precisely the kind of question that Powers as a novelist is interested in troubling and 
undermining.16  
The Echo Maker also tells the tale of Gerald Weber, a celebrity neuroscientist and 
popular science writer, whom Karin enlists for a second opinion on Mark’s condition. Weber, 
in contrast to the hospital’s doctor, argues that Capgras Syndrome is not simply the result of 
localised trauma, but rather a manifestation of the system trying to maintain normality: 
‘whatever lesions he has suffered, he’s also producing psychodynamic responses to trauma,’ 
Weber suggests.17 Capgras Syndrome, then, is a product of the brain’s homeostatic impulse, 
and, as Weber suggests in a lecture, is only an exaggeration of the way in which an 
undamaged brain functions: ‘The job of consciousness is to make sure that all of the 
distributed modules of the brain seem integrated’ (459). Mark’s mind ‘smoothes over’ the 




explanations to explain a deficit in emotion. Logic depends upon feeling’ (94). In an attempt 
to trigger emotional memory in him, medical staff ask Mark about his job at Iowa Beef 
Processors. Mark’s palpable relief – ‘thank God’, he thinks – that they do not ask him how he 
feels towards the slaughtered animals is telling (56). It suggests that this was the very 
question that they should have asked, for it would have provoked the kind of affective 
response the medical staff were seeking. The implication here is that Mark’s job has already 
required that he suppress an intuitive emotional response to his work. This is, perhaps, not 
surprising given the nature of that work, but we also learn, via his sister’s reminiscence, that 
he had been exceptionally fond of animals as a child, and that he would ‘relate long epics 
from Animalia, the country humans couldn’t get to, populated by heroes, rogues, tricksters, 
and victims’ (27). ‘Animals like me,’ the eleven-year-old Mark had claimed, ‘And they did, 
without fail. Everything on the farm trusted him’, confirms Karin (29). The claim of Mark's 
eleven-year-old self is not just an expression of the presumed and anthropomorphised 
affective disposition of animals toward him. It is dual coded, for it is also a statement of his 
own animality: ‘animals, like me’, it also implies. It is precisely this awareness of his own 
animality, and the human place in the wider non-human world, that Mark has had to 
repudiate to work at the beef processors. In other words, even before the accident, Mark has 
had to sever the connection between external reality and affective response to that reality.18 
The novel, then, forces the reader to question why such disconnections should be necessary in 
the late capitalist world. 
The novel’s setting in the Midwest is instructive for an understanding of this, since it 
is here, in ‘the heart of the heartland’ of America, that the dramatic decline in farmland 
communities, and the rise of agribusiness has been felt most keenly.19 This agribusiness 




Omnivore’s Dilemma which largely focuses on the Midwest, and which was published in the 
same year as Powers’ novel. In his introduction, Pollan writes that,  
what we eat represents our most profound engagement with the natural world [….] Our eating also constitutes a 
relationship with dozens of other species – plants, animals, and fungi – with which we have coevolved to the 
point where our fates are deeply entwined [….] What is most troubling, and sad, about industrial eating is how 
thoroughly it obscures all these relationships and connections [….] But forgetting, or not knowing in the first 
place, is what the industrial food chain is all about, the principal reason it is so opaque, for it we could see what 
lies on the far side of the increasingly high walls of our industrial agriculture, we would surely change the way 
we eat.20 
Pollan is surely correct here, but Powers’ novel suggests that the possession of facts alone 
may not be enough to trigger such a change. When Weber and Karin meet over a pizza to 
discuss Mark, Karin comments, ‘I'm surprised they can sell any cow parts at all, in this part 
of the country. You should hear what goes on at that plant. Ask Mark. It’ll put you off your 
feed for good. You know, they have to clip the horns to prevent the crazed beasts from goring 
each other’ (178). Karin’s word choice here is notable for the way in which it lays bare the 
tensions and contradictions in our thinking about non-human animals. In referring to ‘cow 
parts’ Karin foregrounds the butchery involved, and affirms linguistically that she is aware of 
the horrors of the meat industry as she reinstates the referent (the cow) absented by the 
occlusive term ‘beef’. While her use of ‘feed’ (rather than food) might draw together the 
human and the non-human – we speak more readily of ‘animal feed’ than we do of ‘human 
feed’ – the phrase ‘crazed beasts’ serves to ‘other’ the creatures. Karin’s surprise at the fact 
that the treatment of the creatures in the plant does not prevent their parts being sold as 
human feed stems from the belief that the treatment might render the ‘cow parts’ unfit for 
human consumption; her assertion that knowledge of that treatment ought to put one off 




of the facts does not, in fact, ‘hinder her appetite’, nor does it prevent her from ordering the 
meat supreme pizza (178).  
On her own terms, then, Karin’s decision to eat meat is illogical. Given Weber’s – 
and, I think, the novel’s – neurological position that ‘Logic depends upon feeling,’ it is no 
surprise that Karin does not (at this point in the novel) make the dietary change spoken of by 
Pollan. Mark’s accident leaves Karin understandably numb, but the brief descriptions of the 
life she led before it suggests that she had already accepted a life with minimal feeling: ‘Past 
thirty, she had no more time or pride to risk on ambition. Nothing wrong with honest 
gruntwork for a secure company that lacked all pretension […] She couldn’t explain to her 
brother or anyone: status and satisfaction meant nothing. Competence was all. At long last, 
her life had stopped misleading her’ (16). If there is an element of willed submission here, it 
is also a submission called for by the corporate world in which she lives and works.21 Upon 
his arrival in Kearney, Nebraska, Weber thinks that he ‘might have been anywhere’, noting 
that ‘the usual gamut of franchises – motel, gas, convenience store, and fast food – reassured 
the accidental pilgrim that he was somewhere just like anywhere. Progress would at last 
render every place terminally familiar’ (97). The anonymity of this place is both produced by 
and reinforcing of the capitalist structure which dictates our tastes, and which requires a 
commensurate anonymity from individuals. Karin has accepted the depthless life on offer to 
her. Since ‘logic depends upon feeling’, Karin, lacking the affective response towards non-
human suffering cannot (at this stage in the novel) commit to the ethical response to such 
suffering.22 
The character in the novel who does have a sense of ethical obligation is Daniel, 
childhood friend of Mark, ex-boyfriend of Karin, and a ‘scarecrow vegan’ who lives like an 
‘anchorite’ and works for the local crane refuge (89). Daniel, we are told, ‘mourned more 




one shot at knowing and preserving itself. Instead that one aware animal in creation had 
torched the place’ (72). What Daniel mourns here is the human failure to live up to the ethical 
potentialities and responsibilities conferred upon our species by nature and his way of 
thinking recalls Michel Serres’ belief that there is the need for a kind of ‘natural contract’ (to 
replace the ‘social contract’) through which the human would become the ‘steward’ of the 
planet.23 For Serres this would bring forth a new – and better – kind of humanism.  Many 
reviewers suggested that the undeniably preachy tone of Daniel must mean that he is a 
conduit for the author’s own ‘self-righteousness’.24 This kind of charge has dogged Powers’ 
career, but here, at least, seems wide of the mark. Daniel’s cringing at the price of a meal in a 
restaurant, because ‘eight dollars is a lot of money to the Crane refuge’, his request for a 
‘plateful of sliced vegetables [...] raw carrots, cucumbers [...]’ and his ‘quibbling with them’ 
when they arrive, hardly suggest that the novel ‘surrenders’ to Daniel’s views, or that the 
character is a proxy for the author. 
Rather than suggesting the novel as a straightforward plea for this kind of humanistic 
stewardship, it seems to me to be trying to balance such claims with those produced by the 
more recent posthumanist urge. Powers’ earlier work has often been associated with the 
technological posthumanism derived from the work of critics such as Donna Haraway and N. 
Katherine Hayles; in Ecosickness in Contemporary American Fiction, Heather Houser offers 
a rather strained reading of the posthuman in The Echo Maker along these lines. She suggests 
that Mark ‘mutates into the cinematic version of Frankenstein’s monster’ when the hospital 
‘slit[s] his throat and put[s] a bolt in his skull’, but then concludes that ‘Powers seems to 
disagree with Haraway over the liberating potential of the “cyborg”’.25 We might do better 
though to suggest that the slitting of the throat and the bolt through the head are not in fact a 
reference to James Whale’s Frankenstein (in which the bolt goes through the creature’s 




stunning, and exsanguination. The former constitutes the firing of a bolt through the skull of 
the creature using a pneumatic device or captive bolt pistol, causing massive damage to the 
cerebrum and cerebellum, a spike in intracranial pressure, and immediate loss of 
consciousness. The latter involves bleeding the stunned creature by the insertion of a knife 
into the thoracic cavity and the severance of the carotid artery and jugular vein. Reading the 
passage this way allows us to understand that Mark, suffering from ‘cerebral edema’ and 
requiring a ‘ventricular drain’ because ‘something had spiked the pressure’ inside his skull, 
has been transformed into a creature undergoing the very same procedure that his own work 
at the Iowa Beef Processors facilitates; accordingly, Karin feels the need to look ‘anywhere 
but at his animal eyes’ (10, 8). This moment in the novel does not, then, develop the idea that 
‘transgressing boundaries that delimit humanness can be severely disabling rather than 
enabling and generative’, as Houser suggests.26 Rather, it recalls Mark’s childhood 
acceptance of animality, and provides a salient reminder of the suffering of the non-human 
which predicates the sense of ourselves as human: those creatures must suffer in an inhuman 
way so that the demarcation between human and animal can be maintained as a difference in 
kind, rather than of degree.  
This suggests the emergence in Powers of a different kind of posthumanism, then, one 
which has developed through critical animal studies and which, in the words of Cary Wolfe, 
demonstrates ‘that we – whoever “we” are – are in a profound sense constituted as human 
subjects within and atop a non human otherness.’27 Wolfe points out the way in which earlier 
declarations of posthumanism were premised upon the idea of ‘human perfectibility’, which 
not only betrays a lingering humanism, but, in certain versions, represents in fact an 
‘intensification of humanism’.28 To be truly posthumanist (rather than merely posthuman) 
according to Wolfe, we must not only acknowledge our ethical obligation to other species – 




human. If Mark’s ‘becoming animal’ constitutes one part of this recognition, the form of the 
novel provides another. Each chapter of The Echo Maker is prefaced by a dreamlike 
depiction of the sandhill crane migration which for a few weeks of the year dominates the 
Nebraskan plains around the River Platte. These sections serve to envelop the ‘terminally 
familiar’ world being produced by the human under late capitalism in a world of non-human 
strangeness: ‘This year’s flight has always been. Something in the birds retraces a route laid 
down centuries before their parents showed it to them. And each crane recalls the route still 
to come’ (4). As the brevity of the human element (the plot of the novel) is highlighted by the 
deep time of the crane, a genus which has one of the longest fossil histories of any bird and 
which precedes the human by about 8 million years, so too is the capacity of the human to 
structure the world implicitly challenged by the fact these sections are situated outside the 
main ordering principles of the novel as a form: the chapters. It is fitting, then, that one of the 
most powerful images of the novel is of a posthuman ecosystem of the future: ‘when the 
surface of the earth is parched and spoiled, when life is pressed down to near-nothing […] 
nature and its maps will use the worst that man can throw at it. The outcome of owls will 
orchestrate the night, millions of years after people work their own end’ (443). 
 
III. New Sincerity and the Demands of the Anthropocene 
David Foster Wallace’s oft-cited suggestion that fiction ought to be about ‘what it 
means to be a fucking human being’ has been taken as heralding a ‘new sincerity’ in fiction 
after postmodernism.29 Although Foster Wallace himself offered innovative (sometimes 
torturous) ways of trying to achieve his aim, it is significant that the case for sincerity is made 
most convincingly, according to Adam Kelly, by considering those writers, such as Franzen, 




dependence on ‘the notion of the liberal subject that also underlies classic nineteenth-century 
realist fiction’, as Kelly notes, and as we see in Purity.31 Amitav Ghosh, in The Great 
Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (2016), notes this focus on the 
individual subject in the recent fiction of, what he calls, ‘sincerity and authenticity’;  he 
suggests that the consequence is that such fiction can only frame moral questions as matters 
of individual choice.32 This is, Ghosh argues, inadequate for thinking about the exigencies of 
our time, which are primarily ecological, not only because these are issues which need to be 
addressed by the collective commons, but because any individual would then be subjected to 
a test of sincerity and consistency which most would fail (who can truly say that they do 
everything possible to help prevent environmental degradation?)  
It is effectively this test that Anabel is made to fail by Franzen, as she gives in to what 
the novel frames as ‘reality’ by finally agreeing to take some of her father’s money to help 
Pip. That failure might be better understood in the context of an essay by Franzen published 
in the New Yorker in 2015.33 There Franzen bemoans the fact that climate change has come to 
dominate the ecological agenda on the grounds that it has had the effect of marginalising the 
more immediate goals of conservation. He argues that the abstraction of climate change – the 
way in which any individual’s effort to improve the situation has no discernible effect – 
works against our intuitive logic: ‘the human brain evolved to focus on the present, not the 
far future’ so that climate change ‘deeply confuses’ it.34 Thus, Franzen frames the 
contemporary ecological moment as offering a choice between saving birds in the present or 
saving humans of the future; he declares himself personally in favour of the former. The 
sensibility behind this strange, defeatist, and implausible argument (decried by many, 
including the American Audubon Society) produces a tension in Purity, which feels like a 
novel designed to recuperate the form as one primarily concerned with individual selfhood 




really like – and has little faith in – the human.35 Anabel’s efforts, then, count for nothing in 
Franzen’s fictional world because they would count for nothing in the world outside the 
novel.  
Franzen notes in the New Yorker piece that we ‘live in the Anthropocene now’.36 
Defined broadly as the epoch when human activity is considered to be the dominant influence 
on the ecology of the Earth, the concept, although proposed by scientists, has had most 
impact in the arts and humanities. For Timothy Clark – as for Ghosh – the Anthropocene 
represents ‘a cultural threshold’, which requires us to be more inventive in all aspects of 
critical thinking because the problems it raises ‘resist representation of the kinds of scale on 
which most thinking, culture, art and politics operate.’37 Clark sees the Anthropocene as 
demanding nothing less than a revolution in cultural activity, asking: ‘at what point does 
continuing in activities that were once merely normal or even admirable turn, despite itself, 
into intellectual evasion?’38 If it was already possible to intuit something intellectually 
evasive in Franzen’s turn to realism as it was articulated and rationalised in ‘Mr Difficult’, 
the writer’s notorious piece on William Gaddis, then Gram’s demonstration of the way in 
which the ecological engagement of Freedom is stymied by this aesthetic decision only 
furthers that sense.39 What Purity, and the New Yorker piece reveal, however, is that the 
ecological views are, or have become, just as conservative, just as defeatist, as Franzen’s 
views on fiction.40  
Franzen’s way of setting off the human against the non-human ignores the axiom 
articulated by the American environmental thinker John Muir: ‘when we try to pick out 
anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.’ The quotation is 
used as a subheading in Powers’ short story ‘The Seventh Event’, published a couple of years 
before The Echo Maker.41 The story represents a fictional reminiscence about a late scholar 




Powers) frustrated by the continued assumption ‘that all of life hung upon humanity’.42 
Erdmann – a scientist by vocation, but with wide interests – found this assumption reinforced 
by the novel as a form. Her own work constituted a plea for ‘a literature that tried to recover 
the obscene majority of existence typically brushed aside by the novel of character 
revelation’.43 The story provides a clever way for Powers to express an ideal while also 
incorporating within the narrative his own intuitive response to the difficulty of that ideal: the 
authorial surrogate notes, ‘Erdmann scared me out of the fiction of the self. But I feel a little 
fraudulent ignoring that self’.44 The Echo Maker is an attempt to negotiate this difficulty, an 
attempt to balance the desire for a non-human perspective with the constant pull of one’s own 
species. Its ruminations on consciousness and memory make it a novel concerned with the 
very notion of what a (human) self is; but the oneiric mingling of the human and non-human 
perspectives highlights the fact that humans are not the only makers of meaning in the world. 
In so doing it offers an example of the way in which the novel as a cultural interjection might 
harness postmodernism’s challenge to human subjectivity and representationalism, and turn it 
towards new and urgent ends.  
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